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Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and
institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We ﬁnd that
in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly
after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling
beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely to choose the sanctioning
institution. Sanctioning and non-sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is
endogenous and the former shows a higher level of truth-telling but lower material
payoﬀs. It is shown that our experimental ﬁndings are consistent with the equilibrium
analysis of a logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of
individuals: one consisting of subjects who perceive non-monetary lying costs as
senders and non-monetary costs when being lied to as receivers and one consisting
of payoﬀ maximizers.
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11 Introduction
The strategic transmission of information is ubiquitous in economic interactions. As long as
information is asymmetrically distributed among market participants, there is an incentive
to strategically hide or release private information. For instance, a seller of a ﬁnancial asset
who is privately informed about future price changes may wish to talk a potential buyer
into an early purchase if he expects the market price to fall while trying to postpone the
transaction if he expects the price to rise (see e.g. Wang et al., 2010). Likewise, a seller
of a commodity who has private information about its quality (as in the lemons-market in
Akerlof, 1970) may wish to communicate a good quality (e.g. by oﬀering a warranty) while
seeking to conceal any information that reduces the potential buyer’s willingness to pay.
A framework to study the strategic transmission of payoﬀ relevant information is sender-
receiver games. In their seminal contribution on information transmission between payoﬀ
maximizing individuals, Crawford and Sobel (1982) demonstrate that the more the pref-
erences of the informed (the sender) and the uninformed agent (the receiver) are aligned,
the more information is transmitted in sequential equilibrium. Evidence in favor of this
main ﬁnding has been provided by Dickhaut et al. (1995) via laboratory experiments. Ex-
periments by Cai and Wang (2006), however, show that senders over-communicate relative
to standard equilibrium predictions; that is, on average, individuals reveal more private
information than predicted by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Regarding the willingness to
enforce truth-telling, S´ anchez-Pag´ es and Vorsatz (2007) identify receivers who voluntary
incur a cost in order to punish the sender after having trusted a lie and ﬁnd that these
subjects are responsible for the observed over-communication.1 The objective of our study
is to investigate how far this over-communication is driven by intrinsic motivations for
truth-telling and how institutional selection (between a sanctioning and non-sanctioning
institution) aﬀects the composition of individuals and the performance of each institution.2
1Throughout the paper we will label a report by the sender that is equal to her private information
as truth and a choice by the receiver that resembles a best response if the sender’s message is truthful as
trust. Hence, ‘trust’ labels the choice of a receiver who is categorized as a ‘believer’ in Crawford (2003).
The labels lie and distrust are deﬁned accordingly. Based on these labels, we will use excessive truth-telling
as a synonym for information revelation beyond the predictions by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
2Already Arrow (1968, p.538) noted that “[o]ne of the character[i]stics of a successful economic system
is that the relations of trust and conﬁdence between principal and agent are suﬃciently strong so that the
agent will not cheat even though it may be “rational economic behavior” to do so.” We are indebted to
one of the referees for this quote.
2In our theoretical analysis, we develop a logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-
AQRE) model with individuals who experience non-monetary costs of lying that is able to
account for the existing experimental evidence. In particular, the model predicts (i) the
frequency of truthful revelations of private information to increase in the non-monetary
costs from misreporting private information (costs of lying), (ii) the frequency of sanction-
ing after trusting a lie to increase in the non-monetary costs from being exposed to lies
(costs of being lied to), and (iii) the expected utility to be independent of the expected
truth-telling frequency if the individual does not perceive non-monetary costs – otherwise
it is increasing in the truth-telling frequency (anticipation of non-monetary costs).
Regarding a deeper understanding of the motives behind truth-telling, the enforcement
of truth-telling through costly sanctions, and the anticipation of these eﬀects in insti-
tutional choice, two research questions emerge from these theoretical predictions for the
experimental part of our study. (i) Is there a correlation between the two main ingredients
of the model (costs of lying and costs of being lied to), i.e., do individuals who sanction
lies also tell the truth excessively while others do not? (ii) Do individuals with diﬀerent
attitudes towards sanctioning also diﬀer in their choices for an institutional environment,
i.e. is there a self-selection of individuals with distinct costs of lying and being lied to into
diﬀerent institutional environments?
To analyze these questions, we conduct an experiment that consists of two institutions
and two phases. The sanction-free institution corresponds to a simple constant-sum sender-
receiver game with antagonistic payoﬀs that, in its reduced form, resembles matching
pennies. The sanctioning institution extends the sanction-free institution by giving the
receiver the option – after observing whether the sender told the truth or lied about her
private information – to reduce the payoﬀs of both players to zero. In the ﬁrst 60 rounds
of the experiment (random assignment phase), we randomly assign subjects to the two
institutions. This matching procedure allows for a within subjects analysis of truth-telling
in the presence and absence of sanctioning opportunities, answering question (i). For an
investigation of question (ii), we add a second phase of another 40 rounds (selection phase)
where individuals can choose in each round which institution to join.
In the experiment, we observe excessive truth-telling and trust compared to the stan-
dard equilibrium predictions and identify sanctioners as individuals who predominantly
sanction after having trusted a lie. We ﬁnd that sanctioners are responsible for the exces-
3sive truth-telling in both institutions and phases, which implies that the two non-monetary
costs are correlated. With respect to institutional choice in the selection phase, we observe
that sanctioners choose the sanctioning institution as often as the sanction-free institution
while the vast majority of the remaining subjects opts for the sanction-free institution.
Hence, the two institutions typically coexist throughout the selection phase.3 Since the
sanctioning institution exhibits more truth-telling than the sanction-free institution and
since we also observe sanctions throughout the selection phase, we can conclude that there
are individuals (predominantly sanctioners) who deliberately choose an institution with
lower material payoﬀs but a higher level of truth-telling.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the impact of non-monetary lying
costs on truth-telling, trust, and sanctioning in a logit-AQRE. We present the experimen-
tal design and procedures in Section 3. Testable hypotheses are derived in Section 4. The
experimental results are presented in Section 5 and the logit-AQRE estimates in Section 6.
In Section 7, we relate our ﬁndings to the existing literature, and discuss possible im-
plications. Formal proofs, the sensitivity analysis, and the experimental instructions are
relegated to the Appendices.
2 Theoretical analysis
We consider the sender-receiver game depicted in Figure 1. There are two players: the
action A action B
1 ; 5 5 ; 1
type A
action A action B
5 ; 1 1 ; 5
type B
Figure 1: Sender-receiver game.
sender and the receiver. The sender is either of type A or type B. The actual type
is drawn by nature and the realization is only known by the sender. The players are
informed that both types are equally likely. The receiver decides whether to take action A
or action B. In case the action matches with the sender’s type, the receiver gets a payoﬀ
of 5 ECU and leaves the sender with a payoﬀ of 1 ECU.4 Payoﬀs are reversed in case the
3This is anything but trivial: sanctions are necessarily ineﬃcient as they only destroy payoﬀ and
therefore, it is always optimal for payoﬀ maximizers to choose the sanction-free institution.
4ECU stands for Experimental Currency Unit, the currency used in the experiment.
4action does not match with the sender’s type.
Before the receiver chooses his action, but after the sender has learnt her type, the
sender transmits one of the following two messages to the receiver: message A (“the type
selected by nature is A”) or message B (“the type selected by nature is B”). For simplicity,
we say throughout that the sender tells the truth if her message is equal to her true type,
otherwise we say she tells a lie. Similarly, we say that the receiver trusts if his action
resembles a best response to the reported type of the sender, otherwise we say he distrusts
the message. Hence, the combinations truth–trust and lie–distrust lead to a payoﬀ of 5
ECU to the receiver and only 1 ECU to the sender and the combinations truth–distrust
and lie–trust lead to the reversed payoﬀs.5
We consider this game in two diﬀerent institutional settings: the sanction-free in-
stitution (SFI) and the sanctioning institution (SI). In the sanction-free institution, the
sender-receiver game depicted in Figure 1 is played. In the sanctioning institution, the
receiver has additionally the option to sanction after the game in Figure 1 has been played
and he learned the real type of the sender. If the receiver sanctions, the payoﬀs of both
players are reduced to zero, otherwise the payoﬀs remain unchanged.
One can easily show that under the standard assumption that individuals are selﬁsh
proﬁt maximizers and fully rational, receivers never sanction and all sequential equilibria
of the game in the sanction-free and the sanctioning institution are such that the sender
tells the truth with probability one-half and the receiver trusts with probability one-half
(see Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Hence, no information is transmitted as the receiver’s
prior belief about the true type is not aﬀected by the sender’s message.
One problem of deriving null hypotheses for the experiment on the basis of these stan-
dard assumptions is that the best response correspondences are discontinuous: if the sender
tells the truth with more than ﬁfty percent chance, the receiver should always trust; and,
if the receiver trusts with more than ﬁfty percent chance, the sender should always lie. Go-
eree and Holt (2001) demonstrate in experiments on symmetric and asymmetric games of
matching pennies that such an extreme response is unlikely to be observed empirically. A
better description of behavior is provided by probabilistic choice models such as the logit
agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey
5Due to the symmetry of the game, we can abstain from conditioning strategies on the actually chosen
table. In reduced form, the game resembles a two-by-two constant-sum game like matching pennies.
5(1998). Unlike in the standard best response correspondence, in the logit-AQRE model
strategies that yield lower payoﬀs are played with lower but positive probability. Applying





where E[u(truth)] and E[u(lie)] denote the expected utilities for the sender from telling




where E[v(trust)] and E[v(distrust)] denote the expected utilities for the receiver from
trusting and distrusting, respectively. The parameter λ ∈ [0,∞) captures the level of
“rationality” of the agent. If λ = 0, individuals act totally at random and each action
is played with equal chance. As λ increases, individuals get more and more rational,
and in the limit –as λ converges to inﬁnity– individuals become fully rational and play a
best response. The logit-AQRE is thus a natural generalization of sequential equilibrium
incorporating the possibility of boundedly rational behavior.
The equations for p and q hold for both the sanction-free and the sanctioning institu-
tions. Expected utilities, however, may vary across the two institutions. This is because for
any message m ∈ {truth,lie} of the sender and action a ∈ {trust,distrust} of the receiver,




in the sanctioning institution. Here, v(m,a,0) denotes the utility of the receiver if the
sender reports m, the receiver plays a after observing m, and, ﬁnally, the receiver decides
not to sanction the sender after learning the history of the game (sanctioning s ∈ {0,1}
takes a value of zero). So, since the terminal utilities in the sanctioning institution are
aﬀected by the occasional punishment by the receiver, expected utilities (and thereby the
equilibrium probabilities p∗ and q∗) may diﬀer across institutions.
S´ anchez-Pag´ es and Vorsatz (2007) have shown that the logit-AQRE is unable to explain
the experimental data of constant-sum sender-receiver games when there are only two
6states.6 In particular, the model is unable to incorporate the following two experimental
ﬁndings. (i) According to the logit-AQRE, the sanctioning probability “only” depends
on the terminal utilities. Since the histories truth–distrust and lie–trust lead to the same
payoﬀ for both players, the sanctioning rate should hence be the same for both histories.
Yet, experiments have shown that the sanctioning rate is signiﬁcantly greater when the
receiver has trusted a lie than when the receiver has distrusted the truth.7 (ii) The logit-
AQRE predicts perfectly randomized truth-telling and trust for all λ, yet experimental
data establishes that the sender tells the truth and the receiver trusts in more than half of
the cases in both institutions.
To account for the existing experimental evidence, we analyze in this sequel a logit-
AQRE with players who experience non-monetary costs of lying and being lied to. Al-
though it is not possible to derive a closed form solution, equilibrium comparative statics
can be used to derive testable hypotheses. Let us assume that the utility function u of the
sender is u(m,a,s) = πS(m,a,s)−c·I(m = lie) with the sender’s message m ∈ {truth,lie},
the receiver’s action a ∈ {trust,distrust} and the receiver’s sanctioning decision s ∈ {0,1}.
If sanctions are not available, we set s = 0. The term πS(m,a,s) corresponds to the mone-
tary payoﬀ for the sender and I(m = lie) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the
sender lies and 0 otherwise. Hence, c ≥ 0 measures the lying costs of the sender (see Kartik,
2009; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; S´ anchez-Pag´ es and Vorsatz, 2009). Similarly, the utility
function v of the receiver is assumed to be v(m,a,s) = πR(m,a,s) − d · I(m = lie,s = 0)
with the receiver’s monetary payoﬀ πR(m,a,s) and indicator function I(m = lie,s = 0).
The indicator function takes the value 1 if the sender lies to the receiver and the lie remains
unsanctioned. The parameter d ≥ 0 measures the costs of being lied to.8
6See, Cai and Wang (2006) for an application of the logit-AQRE with payoﬀ maximizing players when
there are more than two states.
7Further evidence is provided by Xiao (2010) who allows for third party punishments in a sender-receiver
game and ﬁnds that most third parties (19 out of 27) punish only false messages.
8v(m,a,s) can be interpreted as the utility function of a (negatively) reciprocal individual, who considers
lies as unkind but reduces (or, in our speciﬁcation, nulliﬁes) his suﬀering from being exposed to an unkind
act through retaliation. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between this model and other
models of non-standard preferences see Subsection 7.2. Note that our speciﬁcation of the receiver’s utility
highlights the interplay between the costs of being lied to and the payoﬀ consequences of a sanction.
For instance, receivers may well sanction after lie–trust but not after lie–distrust as already observed
in S´ anchez-Pag´ es and Vorsatz (2007). Furthermore, our model predicts receivers to sanction more after
truth–distrust (without lie, but lower payoﬀ) than after lie–distrust (with lie, but with higher payoﬀ) if
and only if the cost of being exposed to a lie d is less than the payoﬀ diﬀerence between these two histories.
7Proposition 1. (Sanction-free Institution)
In the unique logit-AQRE of the sanction-free institution, (i) p∗ and q∗ are independent of
d, (ii) c = 0 or λ = 0 implies that p∗ = q∗ = 1
2, and (iii) if λ > 0, both p∗ and q∗ are
strictly increasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that in the sanction-free institution, the equilibrium probabilities are
independent of d and strictly increasing in c whenever λ > 0. Next, we turn our attention
to the sanctioning institution. In particular, we obtain that if c = d = 0, the sender tells
the truth with probability one-half and the receiver trusts with probability one-half in this
institution as well. A strictly positive d, however, induces the receiver to sanction more
often after history lie–trust than after truth–distrust and the equilibrium probabilities of
truth and trust are again strictly increasing in c.
Proposition 2. (Sanctioning Institution)
In the unique logit-AQRE of the sanctioning institution, (i) c = d = 0 or λ = 0 imply that








and only if d > 0 and λ > 0, and (iii) if λ > 0, both p∗ and q∗ are strictly increasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide the following insights: (a) in the absence of non-monetary
costs, i.e. if c = d = 0, the sender tells the truth with probability one-half and the receiver
trusts with probability one-half in both institutions and there is no diﬀerence between
sanctioning rates after histories that lead to the same payoﬀ distribution; (b) if c = 0 and
d > 0, then the receiver sanctions more often after lie–trust than after truth–distrust and,
at the same time, both players behave in the sanction-free institution as if they were payoﬀ
maximizers; (c) if c > 0 and d = 0, then there is no diﬀerence between sanctioning rates
after histories that lead to the same payoﬀ distribution and there is excessive truth-telling
and excessive trust in the sanction-free institution; and, (d) if c > 0 and d > 0, then the
receiver sanctions more often after lie–trust than after truth–distrust and there is excessive
truth-telling and trust in the sanction-free institution.
83 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment was conducted with the help of the z-Tree toolbox (Fischbacher, 2007)
in the experimental computer laboratory at Maastricht University. All students of the
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration were invited via email to register for
the experiment. In total, we had 8 sessions with 20 subjects per session. Subjects received
written and context-free instructions (see Appendix C) that they could study at their own
pace. Clarifying questions were dealt with privately. Before the experiment started, every
subject had to answer some control questions correctly.
The experiment consists of two phases. The ﬁrst phase is referred to as random assign-
ment phase (RAP) and it lasts 60 rounds. In each round, the 20 subjects are randomly
divided in such a way that 6 subjects are assigned to the sanction-free institution and 14
to the sanctioning institution.9 Next, subjects within the same institution are randomly
matched into pairs. Within each pair, one subject is randomly chosen to be the sender,
the other subject is the receiver. After all subjects are informed about the institution they
are assigned to and their role, the respective game is played.
The second phase of a session, the selection phase (SP), lasts 40 rounds. At the be-
ginning of each round, subjects decide in which institution to play. After all subjects have
made their decisions, subjects within the same institution are randomly matched into pairs.
In case of an odd number of subjects in an institution, one randomly chosen subject in
each institution stays unmatched and receives a ﬁxed payoﬀ of 3 ECU. In each pair, one
subject is randomly chosen to be the sender, the other subject is the receiver. After all
subjects are informed about their role, the respective game is played.10
After each round, subjects were informed about all decisions taken within the respective
pair, the resulting payoﬀs, and the individual cumulative payoﬀs. Subjects were never given
any feedback on the identity of the players they were matched to.11 Subjects were paid
privately in cash immediately after the experiment. The payoﬀs gathered throughout the
9We chose this imbalanced assignment in order to increase the probability that receivers have the
opportunity to sanction after diﬀerent histories.
10The particular sequence of the random assignment phase before the selection phase serves two goals.
First, it is guaranteed that subjects acquire some experience with both institutions prior to any selection
opportunities. Second, it facilitates a proper type identiﬁcation based on sanctioning behavior.
11Observe that subjects do not have incentives to coordinate on a particular action as preferences
are completely antagonistic and payoﬀs are constant-sum. Moreover, we preserve the anonymity of the
matchings. Hence, supergame eﬀects can be excluded.
9session were transferred into euros at an exchange rate of 0.05; that is, one ECU was worth
5 Eurocents.12 The average payment was A C 16.59 (including 3 euros for showing up). A
session lasted 105 minutes on average.
4 Hypotheses
In our experiment, subjects take decisions with respect to truth-telling, trust, sanctioning,
and institutional choice. Decisions regarding truth-telling, trust, and institutional choice
can be driven by the subject’s preference and her expectation over actions of the other
player. In contrast, the receiver decides upon sanctioning under complete information
(observing all preceding actions and the sender’s type) and at the ﬁnal stage of the game.
Hence, sanctioning decisions do not depend on (unobserved) beliefs over actions and are
therefore a more direct expression of preferences. For example, individuals who sanction
after having trusted a lie but not after having distrusted the truth reveal a preference for
truth-telling (i.e., costs of being lied to) as their willingness to costly reduce the payoﬀ of
the sender depends on the particular message being sent.
Our main methodological approach will therefore be to analyze whether the decisions
towards truth-telling and institutional selection depend on the sanctioning behavior; in
this way, we separate beliefs from preferences to the largest extent possible. At the same
time, this approach will also allow us to address several important questions: Is it true that
those who reveal a preference for truth-telling in the role of the receiver are responsible for
the excessive truth-telling in the presence and absence of sanctioning opportunities found
in earlier studies? If yes, we would be able to conclude that preferences for truth-telling
of the senders (i.e., lying aversion) are likely to play a crucial role why more information
than predicted by the standard sequential equilibrium is contained in the messages. Also,
is it true that somebody who reveals a preference for truth-telling as a sender (as identiﬁed
in the former step) opts more often for the sanctioning institution than somebody without
such preference? If yes, individuals self sort into diﬀerent environments according to their
preferences with possibly important consequences for the functioning of these institutions
in terms of economic eﬃciency and information revelation.
12We decided to pay subjects according to their cumulative payoﬀs because a lottery (one round is
randomly determined for payment) would provide subjects with a device to randomize over actions. Paying
for the sum of the payoﬀs, on the other hand, implies that subjects have to randomize explicitly.
10Given this structure, we have to identify ﬁrst the subjects with non-standard prefer-
ences as receivers. This is done as follows. For each subject, the sanctioning decisions
after the history lie–trust in the random assignment phase are assumed to be independent
Bernoulli trials with success probability 0.5. Using the actual data, we can then test the
null hypothesis that the success probability is smaller than or equal to 0.5 against the alter-
native hypothesis that the success probability is greater than 0.5. The degree of conﬁdence
with which this test is rejected is ﬁnally used to classify subjects. If the one-sided p-value
of this test is smaller than or equal to 0.20, then a subject is assigned to the group of
sanctioners. All subjects that are not classiﬁed as sanctioners, are classiﬁed as others.13,14
Our ﬁrst hypothesis regards the sanctioning behavior of these groups.
Hypothesis 1. (Sanctioning)
Sanctioners punish signiﬁcantly more often after lie–trust than after truth–distrust. The
others sanction as often after truth–distrust as after lie–trust.
Under Hypothesis 1, we are able to conclude from Proposition 2 that only the sanctioners
have a strictly positive d. Given our main objective of identifying subjects with diﬀerent
preferences towards truth-telling, we aim to show in the next step of our analysis that only
the sanctioners suﬀer if they lie. Since it follows from Proposition 1 that senders with
a strictly positive lying cost tell the truth excessively in the sanction-free institution, we
have to establish that the sanctioners tell the truth in more than half of the cases in this
institution while the others do so with probability one-half.15 Hypothesis 2 is slightly more
general as it requires that all excessive truth-telling found at the population level in both
institutions and phases to be caused by the sanctioners.
Hypothesis 2. (Truth-telling)
Sanctioners tell the truth excessively, the others with probability one-half.
13A separate analysis of individuals who sanction after lie–trust and after truth–distrust (i.e., sanctioning
contingent on the payoﬀ distribution) and of individuals who only sanction after lie–trust but not after
truth–distrust (i.e., sanctioning contingent on a speciﬁc history) is impossible due to the small number of
observations of the history truth–distrust.
14It is shown in Appendix B that our results are robust for a wide range of p-values. To be more
concrete, we consider eight diﬀerent p-values between 0.05 and 0.40 plus an extreme classiﬁcation in which
everybody who punishes at least once is classiﬁed as a sanctioner. Observe that a smaller p-value implies
that a subject is less likely to be classiﬁed as a sanctioner; thus, the group of sanctioners increases as the
p-value is relaxed.
15If there is (anticipated) type heterogeneity, it is a best response for the others to lie excessively in such
a way that no information is transmitted on the aggregate. This contradicts the existing experimental
results on over-communication.
11Under Hypotheses 1 and 2, the others behave on the aggregate as if they were payoﬀ
maximizers. However, it is not necessarily true that the sanctioners face a strictly positive
lying cost; after all, they could simply believe that the receivers distrust very often in the
sanction-free institution so that telling the truth frequently becomes a rational choice even
in the absence of any intrinsic motives to do so. The decision which institution to join
during the selection phase provides additional evidence whether subjects truly care about
truth-telling. In particular, the expected utility of a subject who is equally likely to be the
sender and the receiver is given by the expression
(1 −
P
h∈H σh · rh | {z }
prob.of sanctions
) · 3 − (1 − p) · (c
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In this equation, H denotes the set of all possible histories of the sanction-free institution,
σh is the probability with which h is played given p and q, and rh is the likelihood that the
receiver sanctions after observing h (if applicable).
One sees that there is no reason for payoﬀ maximizers to select the sanctioning insti-
tution beyond some degree of experimentation. As discussed in Section 2, there is some
sanctioning for all histories in the sanctioning institution and therefore, the expected mon-
etary payoﬀ is necessarily lower in this institution. This is diﬀerent for an individual
with non-standard preferences. The expected utility is now increasing in p so that if the
level of truth-telling is higher in the sanctioning than in the sanction-free institution and
if the individual cares suﬃciently about truth-telling, then the expected utility is higher
in the sanctioning institution.16 Our third hypothesis therefore states implicitly that the
sanctioners anticipate higher levels of truth-telling in the sanctioning institution.
Hypothesis 3. (Institutional selection)
Sanctioners choose the sanctioning institution signiﬁcantly more often than the others.
Under Hypotheses 1–3, it is possible to divide the experimental population into two sub-
groups: one group that cares suﬃciently about truth-telling and anticipates a higher level
of truth-telling in the sanctioning institution and another group that can be modeled as
16Observe that
P
h∈H σh · rh can be rewritten as p · q · rtruth,trust + p · (1 − q) · rtruth,distrust + (1 − p) ·
q · rlie,trust + (1 − p) · (1 − q) · rtruth,trust. By Proposition 2, r∗
lie,trust > r∗
truth,distrust whenever d > 0. Also,
we know from former experiments that rtruth,trust = rlie,distrust ≈ 0 and that q > 0.5 in both institutions.
Hence, the probability of sanctioning is decreasing in p for the parameter range we are interested in; in
particular, the derivative with respect to p reduces to (1 − q) · rtruth,distrust − q · rlie,trust < 0.
12payoﬀ maximizers. To obtain this insight we did not have to take into account whether
or not the receiver trusts. So, this decision is not directly related to intrinsic preferences
towards truth-telling. Nevertheless, these preferences may matter indirectly if the receiver
tends to best reply to the expected behavior of the sender. In particular, it follows from
Propositions 1 and 2 that the excessive truth-telling for the sanctioners triggers excessive
trust. Payoﬀ maximizers are again expected to randomize perfectly.
Hypothesis 4. (Trust)
Sanctioners trust excessively, the others with probability one-half.
5 Results
This section is divided into four parts. We analyze ﬁrst the sanctioning behavior throughout
the experiment. In particular, we classify subjects by means of their sanctioning behavior
in the random assignment phase as indicated in the former section. This allows us to
study truth-telling, institutional selection, and trust separately for individuals with possibly
diﬀerent preferences regarding truth-telling.
In our statistical analysis, we proceed as follows. First, we calculate for each session
the overall percentage of the variables of interest (truth-telling, trust, sanctioning for each
history, and institutional selection). This results in eight truly independent observations
(one per session). Next, we apply one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to these obser-
vations to evaluate our hypotheses.17 For the tests on excessive truth-telling/trust the
experimental data is paired with the logit-AQRE equilibrium prediction when players are
payoﬀ maximizers.
5.1 Sanctioning
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the sanctioning rates after the histories lie–trust
and truth–distrust, the two histories when the receiver gets the low payoﬀ, over rounds
(clustered per 5 rounds). Sanctioning after truth–trust and lie–distrust, the two histories
when the receiver gets the high payoﬀ, only took place once for each history. Therefore,
we ignore these histories from now on.
17As our hypotheses on truth-telling and trust for the others are not directional, tests should actually
be two-sided. Yet, the p-values in Tables 4 and 7 show that the conclusions remain the same.
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Figure 2: Sanctioning rates after truth–distrust (circles) and lie–trust (bullets) over rounds (5-
round averages).
First of all, the occurrence of sanctioning is in sharp contrast with the prediction of the
sequential equilibrium with payoﬀ maximizing players. Moreover, Figure 2 suggests that
there is more sanctioning after lie–trust than after truth–distrust contradicting the logit-
AQRE with payoﬀ maximizing players.18 We also see that the transition to the selection
phase increases sanctioning after lie–trust but not after truth–distrust. These observations
are conﬁrmed by the test results displayed in Table 1.
lie–trust truth–distrust
RAP 47% [0.0072] 15%
[0.0150] [0.3363]
SP 64% [0.0173] 14%
Table 1: Average sanctioning rates for the whole population. Between brackets, we display the
p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the diﬀerence in sanctioning between the
two histories and the two phases.
Result 1 (Sanctioning–I). The sanctioning rate after lie–trust is higher than after truth–
distrust. Institutional selection increases the sanctioning rate after lie–trust but not after
truth–distrust.
Table 2 summarizes the average sanctioning rates after the histories lie–trust and truth–
distrust in the two phases for the two subgroups. Based on the procedure introduced in
the former section, 53 out of the 160 participants are classiﬁed as sanctioners.
18The diﬀerence between the two trends narrows down at the end of the experiment. Note, however,
that the sanctioning rate after the history truth–distrust over the last ten rounds is only based on 14
observations.
14lie–trust truth–distrust
RAP 92% [0.0059] 20%
[0.3892] [0.0262]
SP 91% [0.0137] 10%
lie–trust truth–distrust
RAP 15% [0.3099] 14%
[0.0344] [0.3371]
SP 31% [0.0865] 17%
Table 2: Average sanctioning rates for the sanctioners (left panel) and the others (right panel).
Between brackets, we display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the
diﬀerence in sanctioning between the two histories and the two phases.
Most importantly, the sanctioners punish more often after lie–trust than after truth–
distrust even though both histories lead to the same payoﬀ distribution. The sanctioning
behavior of the others, however, does not diﬀer between these two histories. Secondly,
the sanctioners punish more often than the others after lie–trust throughout the selection
phase (p = 0.0072), but their sanctioning behavior does not diﬀer from that of the others
after truth–distrust in either phase (p = 0.2419 for RAP and p = 0.2858 for SP). Finally,
comparing the sanctioning behavior across phases, it can be observed that the sanctioners
punish less often after history truth–distrust in the selection phase than in the random
assignment phase and that the others punish more often after history lie–trust in the
selection phase than in the random assignment phase.
Result 2 (Sanctioning-II). The sanctioners punish more often after lie–trust than after
truth–distrust in both phases, the others do so only in the selection phase. The sanctioning
rate after truth–distrust does not diﬀer between subgroups.
Result 2 and Propositon 1 show together that the sanctioners have a positive d in both
phases. For the others, this is only the case for the selection phase. Hence, our data largely
supports Hypothesis 1.
5.2 Truth-telling
Figure 3 displays the development of the average truth-telling rate during the sessions. It
can be seen that subjects tend to tell the truth excessively in both institutions and both
phases. The excessive truth-telling seems most prominent in the sanctioning institution
during the selection phase, however the diﬀerence between the two institutions is most vis-
ible in the random assignment phase over the ﬁrst twenty rounds. Finally, the opportunity
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Figure 3: Truth-telling in the sanction-free institution (circles) and in the sanctioning institution
(bullets) over rounds (5-round averages).
Table 3 summarizes the average truth–telling rates in both institutions and phases and
the test results for excessive truth-telling. In addition, it displays the test results for the
diﬀerence in truth-telling rates between the two institutions for each of the two phases
and between the two phases for each of the two institutions. Except for the sanctioning
institution during the selection phase, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant excessive truth-telling. The lack of
signiﬁcance, however, seems to be driven by one session in which the sanctioning institution
has only been chosen for a few times. To see this, note that in the session in question,
the average truth-telling level of 30% throughout the selection phase is based upon 48
messages, while the number of messages in the other seven sessions ranges from 160 to 320
(with resulting truth-telling levels between 55% to 60% and even 85% in one session).
Accordingly, the p-value changes from 0.0708 to 0.0196 once the session in question is left
out of the analysis.
SFI SI
RAP 54% [0.0517] 58%
(0.0209) (0.0105)
[0.2643] [0.4168]
SP 55% [0.1355] 62%
(0.0105) (0.0708)
Table 3: Average truth-telling rates for the overall population. In parenthesis, we display the
p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excessive truth-telling. In brackets, we
display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the diﬀerence in truth-telling
between the two institutions and the two phases.
The data also reveals that during the random assignment phase, the truth-telling rate in
the sanctioning institution is actually greater than the one in the sanction-free institution.
16However, the diﬀerences do not turn out to be signiﬁcant. Finally, for both institutions, the
transition to the selection phase does not lead to a signiﬁcant change of the truth-telling
rate.
Result 3 (Truth-telling–I). Subjects tell the truth excessively in both institutions through-
out both phases. Institutional selection has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on truth-telling.
For an interpretation of these results, we continue with a comparison of the two subgroups.
Table 4 provides the relevant numbers on subgroup-averages and test results.
SFI SI
RAP 64% [0.0465] 73%
(0.0059) (0.0059)
[0.5000] [0.0912]
SP 63% [0.0807] 78%
(0.0178) (0.0178)
SFI SI
RAP 49% [0.1039] 51%
(0.2201) (0.3365)
[0.0395] [0.0211]
SP 53% [0.0058] 42%
(0.1629) (0.0608)
Table 4: Average truth-telling rates for the sanctioners (left panel) and the others (right panel).
In parenthesis, we display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excessive
truth-telling. In brackets, we display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on
the diﬀerence in truth-telling between the two institutions and the two phases.
The sanctioners tell the truth excessively in both institutions throughout both phases.
Excessive truth-telling among the others is nowhere found to be signiﬁcant. In fact, the
data indicates that the others even lie excessively in the sanctioning institution during the
selection phase. Moreover, the sanctioners tell the truth more often than the others on






, the only instance where this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant
at the 5% conﬁdence level is the sanction-free institution during the selection phase. The
sanctioners also tend to tell the truth more often when there are sanctioning opportunities.
For the random assignment phase this eﬀect is signiﬁcant, and so it is for the selection
phase if the ﬁrst session is not taken into account (p = 0.0196). Once the institution is
subject to choice, the others are found to lie more in the sanctioning institution than in the
sanction-free institution. A similar result is not found for the random assignment phase.
Institutional selection does not aﬀect the truth-telling behavior of the sanctioners. On the
other hand, the transition to the selection phase causes the others to tell the truth more
in the sanction-free and less in the sanctioning institution.
17Result 4 (Truth-telling–II). Sanctioners tell the truth more often than the others. Only
sanctioners tell the truth excessively, and they do so in both institutions and phases.
Result 4 indicates that the sanctioners are responsible for the excessive truth-telling in
the presence and absence of sanctioning opportunities, which is in line with what has been
predicted by Hypothesis 2. Hence, we can conclude that the others behave on the aggregate
as if they are payoﬀ maximizers. Also, the sanctioners must be assumed to have a strictly
positive lying cost c if one wants to explain their behavior with the proposed logit-AQRE.
5.3 Institutional selection





Table 5: Institutional selection.
In more than two-thirds of the cases, individuals have selected the sanction-free insti-
tution. However, the sanctioners have chosen the sanctioning institution in more than half
of the cases, whereas the others only selected this institution in one out of ﬁve cases. The
diﬀerence between the subgroups is signiﬁcant (p = 0.0059). Figure 4 indicates that the
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Figure 4: Choice ratio of the sanctioning institution during the selection phase for the sanctioners
(bullets) and the others (circles) over rounds (2-round averages).
18To investigate the connection between aggregate behavior and individual institutional
choice, we test our data on institutional selection for the hypothesis that individuals ran-
domize over institutions with probabilities as depicted in Table 5 (i.e., sanctioners (others)
randomize in each round in such a way that they end up in the sanction-free institution
in 49% (80%) of the cases). Figure 5 presents the cumulative distributions of switch-
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Figure 5: Cumulative distributions of switching frequencies among the sanctioners (black curves)
and the others (gray curves). The dashed curves refer to the theoretical prediction for randomiza-
tion, the continuous curves refer to the data coming from the experiment.
The ﬁgure indicates that both types switch less often than predicted by the random-
ization hypothesis. In fact, the sanctioners (the others) switch with probability 0.1180
(0.0911). Also, the randomization hypothesis can be rejected for both subgroups (sanc-
tioners: p = 0.0058, others: p = 0.0058). Hence, institutional choice is not random,
individuals rather tend to stick to “their” institution.
Result 5 (Institutional selection). Both institutions co-exist. Sanctioners choose the
sanctioning institution more often than the others.
Since the data on institutional selection is as predicted by Hypothesis 3, we can conclude
that the sanctioners anticipate a higher level of truth-telling in the sanctioning than in
the sanction-free institution throughout the selection phase. This interpretation is also
supported by the parameter estimation of the logit-AQRE presented in Section 6, where
it is shown that the expected utility for the sanctioners (the others) is higher (lower)
in the sanctioning than in the sanction-free institution. Finally, note that the average
19per round payoﬀ in the sanctioning institution is 16.67% lower than in the sanction-free
institution in the random assignment phase (2.50 ECU versus 3.00 ECU) and 19.45% lower
in the selection phase (2.42 ECU versus 3.00 ECU). Thus, the sanctioners willingly forego a
monetary payoﬀ in order to participate in an institution with a higher level of truth-telling.
Indeed, sanctioners (others) earned on average 13.06 (13.86) Euro not taking into account
the show-up fee. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at p = 0.0085.
5.4 Trust




























Figure 6: Trust in the sanction-free institution (circles) and in the sanctioning institution (bullets)
over rounds (5-round averages).
In the sanctioning institution, receivers trust excessively and there seems to be more
trust when the institution is an element of choice. In the sanction-free institution, sub-
jects only seem to trust excessively when randomly assigned to an institution. Table 6
summarizes the average trust rates in both institutions and phases and the test results for
excessive trust. It also displays the test results for the diﬀerence in trust rates between the
two institutions for each of the two phases and between the two phases for each of the two
institutions.
In the random assignment phase, we ﬁnd excessive trust in both institutions, whereas in
the selection phase, there is only excessive trust in the sanctioning institution. Moreover,
trust rates are higher in the sanctioning institution for both phases. Finally, the transi-
tion to the selection phase causes a signiﬁcant change in trust rates. For the sanctioning
institution trust increases, but for the sanction-free institution it decreases.
Result 6 (Trust–I). Subjects trust excessively in both institutions during the random as-
signment phase and in the sanctioning institution during the selection phase. The presence
20SFI SI
RAP 56% [0.0004] 73%
(0.0071) (0.0072)
[0.0072] [0.0072]
SP 50% [0.0004] 86%
(0.4721) (0.0072)
Table 6: Average trust rates for the overall population. In parenthesis, we display the p-values of
the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excessive trust. In brackets, we display the p-values
of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the diﬀerence in trust between the two institutions
and the two phases.
of sanctions enhances trust. Institutional selection increases trust in the sanctioning and
reduces trust in the sanction-free institution.
We now compare behavior with respect to trust for the two subgroups. Table 7 provides
the relevant numbers on subgroup-averages and test results.
SFI SI
RAP 53% [0.0058] 87%
(0.1462) (0.0058)
[0.1313] [0.2641]
SP 46% [0.0058] 92%
(0.2201) (0.0059)
SFI SI
RAP 57% [0.0126] 66%
(0.0342) (0.0058)
[0.0611] [0.0059]
SP 52% [0.0059] 78%
(0.1999) (0.0059)
Table 7: Average trust rates for the sanctioners (left panel) and the others (right panel). In
parenthesis, we display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for excessive
trust. In brackets, we display the p-values of the one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the
diﬀerence in trust between the two institutions and the two phases.
In the sanctioning institution, both subgroups trust excessively throughout both phases.
In the sanction-free institution, excessive trust is only found for the others during the ran-
dom assignment phase. If one compares the two subgroups, one ﬁnds that the sanctioners
trust more than the others in the sanctioning institution during the random assignment






). Moreover, we ﬁnd that the presence of sanctioning opportunities
triggers more trust among both types throughout both phases. Finally, the transition to
the selection phase enhances trust of the others in the sanctioning institution.
Result 7 (Trust–II). The others trust excessively in the sanction-free institution through-
out the random assignment phase and both subgroups trust excessively in the sanctioning
21institution. The sanctioners trust more than the others in the sanctioning institution dur-
ing the random assignment phase. Institutional selection generates more trust by the others
in the sanctioning institution.
Hypothesis 4 is only partly supported by Result 7. While there is excessive trust at
the aggregate level in the random assignment phase in both institutions (as implied by a
positive c and/or a positive d in the logit-AQRE), we do not ﬁnd that this result is triggered
by the sanctioners alone. In fact, only the others trust excessively in the sanction-free
institution during the random assignment phase. This ﬁnding supports the interpretation
that this group expects the sender to tell the truth frequently in this institution, perhaps
because they are aware of the presence of subjects with non-standard preferences towards
truth-telling. Also, both groups trust very often in the sanctioning institution. Hence,
they take into account that the sender tends to tell the truth, either because of the fear of
being punished or because of non-standard preferences.
6 Model estimates
We now present the parameter estimates of the logit-AQRE for the whole population and
the two subgroups. The maximum likelihood estimation procedure applied is the standard
one: we calculate the equilibrium probabilities of the logit-AQRE numerically on a ﬁne
grid and evaluate the objective function at these equilibrium values. In the sanction-free





where K = {truth,lie,trust,distrust} denotes the union of the strategy sets of the sender
and the receiver, nk indicates how often k has been chosen in the experiment, and ρ∗
k is
the equilibrium probability of k given λ and c.
Observe that the data of the sender and the receiver is simultaneously used to determine
the value of the log-likelihood function, yet the probability of truth-telling of the sender
depends on her own lying cost while the probability that the receiver trusts depends on
the expected lying cost of the sender. Hence, our estimations will not provide us with
the actual lying cost of the representative individual of the considered group but with
an average of the actual lying cost (from the data of the sender) and the expected lying
22cost of the sender (from the data of the receiver). It is important to keep this limited
interpretability of the estimates in mind.





where the set K contains now additionally the sanctioning decisions of the receiver.
Sanctioners Others Population
Sanction–free
λ 0.11 1.27 × 105 0.76
[0.02,0.28] [0.95,1.70 × 105] [0.25,2.25]
c 9.81 0.53 0.66
[2.30,31.05] [0.30,0.80] [0.36,1.12]
Exp. Util. 0.38 2.74 2.52
Sanctioning
λ 0.96 1.83 1.52
[0.85,1.00] [1.60,2.15] [1.10,1.55]
c 0.25 1.02 0.56
[-0.05,0.70] [0.80,1.25] [0.40,0.75]
d 3.06 0.06 0.91
[2.75,3.40] [-0.10,0.20] [0.80,1.05]
Exp. Util. 2.23 1.93 2.07
Table 8: Logit-AQRE estimation results for the random assignment phase. In brackets, we display
the 95% conﬁdence interval (obtained via bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions using 70% of the
actual data).
Table 8 presents our estimation results for the whole population and the two subgroups
for the random assignment phase. We bootstrap standard errors to determine the accuracy
of the estimates. In particular, we re-estimate the parameters 1000 times for random
samples that consist of 70% of the actual data. This provides us with a distribution
of estimates for which we calculate the 95% conﬁdence interval (via standardizing the
empirical cdf). We also calculate the expected utility of the representative individuals,
which is the crucial value for deciding whether to join the sanction-free or the sanctioning
institution during the selection phase. When calculating these expectations it is taken
into account that each subject plays the game in the role of the sender and the role of the
receiver with equal probability and that the player in the other role is drawn from the whole
population. Also, since Proposition 1 shows that it is impossible to get an estimate of d in
the sanction-free institution, we have to assume that it is constant across institutions.
23With respect to the sanction-free institution, we ﬁnd that the sanctioners have a sub-
stantial c. The disutility parameter for the others, on the other hand, is rather small. The
very large standard error for λ for the others is perhaps surprising, but it has an easy
explanation: λ is undeﬁned if the probabilities of truth-telling and trust are equal to 0.5,
so the log-likelihood function is extremely ﬂat in λ for the observed truth-telling and trust
rates (49% and 57%).
The results for the sanctioning institution show that only the sanctioners suﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly when being lied to. This is not surprising given that the sanctioners punish
predominantly after history lie–trust while the others punish equally often after truth–
distrust and lie–trust. Since the others do not tell the truth excessively in this institution
either, the positive c must again be caused by their excessive trust. Most importantly,
the average bootstrapped c for the sanctioners is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The
excessive truth-telling of the sanctioners in this institution is hence not driven by lying
costs, it rather seems that the fear of being punished when lying is the main underlying
reason for their behavior (even though this group has at the same time a high lying cost
in the absence of sanctioning opportunities).19
Finally, we also see that the expected utility for the sanctioners is higher in the sanc-
tioning than in the sanction-free institution, which is consistent with our experimental
ﬁnding that these subjects choose the sanctioning institution frequently. The expected
utility for the others, on the other hand, is considerably higher in the sanction-free than in
the sanctioning institution. This suggests that (i) the others should select the sanction-free
institution more often than the sanctioning institution and (ii) the sanction-free institution
should be selected more often by the others than by the sanctioners. We have found both
results to hold true in our statistical analysis.
To complete our econometric analysis, we ﬁnally present in Table 9 the estimation re-
sults for the selection phase. We have seen in our statistical analysis that the aggregate
group behavior does not change much between the two phases. This suggests that indi-
viduals do not switch types when moving from the random assignment to the selection
phase. Consequently, we should still obtain a substantial c (d) for the sanctioners in the
19Note that λ and c are not comparable across institutions because the estimated c is independent of d
in the sanction-free institution but a function of the actual and the expected cost the receiver faces when
not sanctioning a lie in the sanctioning institution. And, since c is not comparable across institutions,
neither is λ.
24sanction-free (sanctioning) institution while the corresponding values for the others should
still be rather small. Also, the expected utility for the others should still be higher in the
sanction-free than in the sanctioning institution whereas it should still be worthwhile for
the sanctioners to opt for the sanctioning institution.
Sanctioners Others Population
Sanction–free
λ 0.02 1.27 × 105 0.02
[0.01,0.09] [0.01,1.70 × 105] [0.01,0.42]
c 51.92 0.66 10.70
[5.50,81.50] [-0.30,4.00] [0.60,31.8]
Exp. Util. -7.17 2.56 0.13
Sanctioning
λ 1.04 2.52 1.68
[0.9,1.30] [1.83,3.46] [1.30,2.25]
c 0.59 1.00 0.46
[0.00,1.30] [0.50,1.52] [0.20,0.80]
d 2.96 0.69 1.27
[2.50,3.50] [0.51,0.84] [1.15,1.65]
Exp. Util. 2.04 1.66 1.94
Table 9: Logit-AQRE estimation results for the selection phase. In brackets, we display the 95%
conﬁdence interval (obtained via bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions using 70% of the actual
data).
Table 9 supports our interpretation that individuals do not switch types during the
experiment. The estimated parameters in the sanctioning institution during the selection
phase are for all groups close to those obtained for the random assignment phase. The
only considerable change across phases is in the sanction-free institution for the sanctioners:
their estimated c increases from 9.81 in the random assignment to 51.92 in the selection
phase. So, if anything, the sanctioners suﬀer more from lying during the selection phase,
giving them even more incentives to opt for the sanctioning institution.
7 Concluding discussion
In this study, we proposed a logit-AQRE model with individuals who experience a disutility
from lying and being lied to. This model is able to describe the central observations of
our laboratory experiment: (i) excessive truth-telling and trust, (ii) history-dependent
sanctions, and (iii) the persistent choice of the sanctioning institution. In this concluding
section, we relate our ﬁndings to the existing theoretical and empirical literature, and
25identify implications for the modeling and the economic impact of strategic information
transmission.
7.1 Bounded rationality and non-standard preferences
There are two possible reasons why a logit-AQRE with payoﬀ maximizing individuals
could fail to explain aggregate behavior in our experiment. First, there could be a lack
of sophistication in the belief-formation process. For instance, Cai and Wang (2006) and
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009) demonstrate the descriptive power of a behavioral type
analysis as discussed in Crawford (2003) or Ellingsen and ¨ Ostling (2010) in sender-receiver
games of varying degrees of conﬂict. In such a behavioral type analysis, players are assumed
to be either “mortal” or “sophisticated”. Mortal agents of level 0 stick to a prescribed
strategy such as always telling the truth and trust, mortal agents of level 1 play a best
response to an opponent who is of level 0 etc.; this iteratively deﬁnes level k. Sophisticated
agents play strategically and best-respond to the actual distribution of sophisticated and
mortal players. While the presence of mortal agents who are “programmed” to tell the truth
could certainly explain excessive truth-telling, sanctioning and choosing the sanctioning
institution would not be an option for those individuals as long as they maximize their
own payoﬀ.20 Moreover, the propensity of sanctioners to choose the sanctioning institution
demonstrates that sanctioners are not just annoyed from having trusted a lie or tell the
truth more frequently because of diﬀerent beliefs about receiver behavior; they rather
anticipate a higher level of truth-telling (due to the existence of sanctions) and regard this
as a suﬃcient compensation for lower aggregate material payoﬀs in this institution.
Once it is acknowledged that mistakes in the belief-formation process are not causing
the observed phenomena, we are left with the second potential explanation which is that
information transmission is driven by non-standard preferences. This view has already been
suggested by Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009) who emphasize that deception as observed
in the lab crucially depends on the individual and social consequences of a lie (or telling the
truth). Speciﬁcally, Gneezy (2005) shows that the average person in his sample prefers not
20Our results imply that lie and trust are the best replies for a payoﬀ maximizer to the observed aggregate
behavior in all phases and institutions; and so is choosing the sanction-free institution. Hence, the observed
truth-telling is not only excessive relative to the logit-AQRE with payoﬀ maximizing individuals but also
relative to the best response to actual behavior. In contrast, trust is excessive relative to logit-AQRE with
payoﬀ maximizing individuals but not relative to the best response.
26to lie if this increases her payoﬀ a little but reduces the receiver’s payoﬀ a great deal, i.e.
if truth-telling is believed to enhance the total surplus and thereby eﬃciency.21 However,
as our sanction-free institution is a constant-sum game, eﬃciency concerns cannot explain
the behavior of sanctioners in our experiment. In particular, eﬃciency oriented individuals
would never sanction or choose the sanctioning institution as it generates a lower surplus
than the sanction-free institution in our experiment nor would they tell the truth excessively
in the sanction-free institution.
While eﬃciency concerns are therefore unﬁt to explain our central ﬁndings, other models
of distributional preferences (e.g., inequity aversion or maximin-preferences)22 are able to
explain certain aspects such as the persistence of sanctioning and the choice of a sanctioning
institution. But, as long as preferences only depend on the eventual payoﬀ distribution
and do not account for truth-telling, histories such as lie–trust and truth–distrust cannot
induce diﬀerent sanctioning behavior, nor can a sender be motivated to tell the truth
excessively. An introduction of costs of lying and being lied to closes this gap, as we have
demonstrated.
However, the disutility from lying and being lied to is not necessarily triggered by the
truthfulness of the sender’s message. The sender’s cost of lying could also depend on the
sender’s beliefs about the receiver’s actions and/or the sender’s expectations about how
much the receiver blames her for a bad outcome. For example, the sender may expect the
receiver to trust in more than half of the cases and therefore tell the truth out of altruistic
motives or because she would feel guilty if the receiver trusted a lie as discussed in Charness
and Dufwenberg (2011).23 Similarly, the receiver’s cost from being lied to could be based
21Sutter (2009) corroborates these ﬁndings and additionally demonstrates the importance of ‘sophisti-
cated deception’ by telling the truth to receivers who are expected not to trust. The importance of the
consequence of a lie is also highlighted in Wang et al. (2010) who demonstrate that pupil dilation of senders
depends on the payoﬀ consequences for the receiver. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) have found that Gneezy’s
data is also consistent with the hypothesis that subjects are of one of the following two behavioral types:
either an individual does not lie at all or she lies whenever the outcome obtained from lying is preferred
to the outcome obtained from telling the truth.
22For example, utility functions as proposed by Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000), or Charness and Rabin (2002). For a recent overview of models of distributional preferences
see Sobel (2005).
23As the type elicitation based on the random assignment phase can hardly be combined with a be-
lief elicitation and as the constant-sum characteristic of the basic game excludes a Pareto improving
information transmission that is crucial in Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), our design does not allow
to disentangle per se and belief/intention-dependent costs of a lie. In our corresponding working paper
(METEOR Research Memorandum 07/034, Maastricht University), we provide a sequential equilibrium
analysis of per se and belief-dependent preferences for truth-telling and demonstrate that both models
27on (negative) reciprocity (as speciﬁed e.g. in Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004, and Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). If the receiver believes that the sender expects
him to trust, he may consider a lie as an unkind act because the sender keeps the large
payoﬀ for himself while the receiver may feel “entitled” to the large payoﬀ as he is taking
action. Observe, however, that an explanation of history-dependent sanctions based on
negative reciprocity requires that a receiver only considers a low payoﬀ the result of an
unkind act if it was the result of trusting a lie. The same payoﬀ (distribution) is also
generated by distrusting a truthful message. In this case, however, we do not observe
signiﬁcant sanctioning. Hence, we need to assume that the kindness of an action does
not only depend on the corresponding payoﬀ but also upon whether the payoﬀ has been
generated by trusting a lie or by distrusting the truth. The costs of being lied to as
introduced in our model can therefore be regarded as a reduced form reciprocity model
that explicitly acknowledges whether a certain payoﬀ conﬁguration has been generated by
a lie (and is therefore considered unkind and sanctioned) or truth-telling (and is therefore
not sanctioned).
In any case, the existence of sanctioners in our experimental society suggests that truth-
telling is more frequent or easier to implement (and a less severe obstacle to economic per-
formance) in real-life situations than indicated by models with rational payoﬀ-maximizing
agents. In particular, details of institutional design (such as opportunities for costly sanc-
tions) that are irrelevant in these models have a systematic impact on individual behavior
and aggregate institutional performance.
7.2 Self selection
The self-selection of individuals into diﬀerent institutions has been addressed by several
laboratory studies. Feld and Tyran (2002) and Alm et al. (1999) allow individuals to vote
on the enforcement of a tax that ﬁnances a public good and analyze the impact of voting on
tax evasion. Typically, voters do not support the enforcement of penalties on tax evasion
(with a negative impact on tax compliance). In Decker et al. (2003), Botelho et al. (2005),
Guillen et al. (2006), Kroll et al. (2007), Ertan et al. (2009), and Sutter et al. (2010)
participants can vote for diﬀerent sanctioning or reward opportunities in a public good
game. In these studies, endogenous institutional choice typically enhances contribution
yield similar predictions for our experimental set-up.
28levels.
More closely related to our set-up with self-selection rather than voting is the paper
by G¨ urerk et al. (2006). In their experiment, individuals repeatedly have to select a sanc-
tioning or a sanction-free institution (as in our selection phase) while playing a public
good game. At the beginning of the experiment, most individuals choose the sanction-free
institution where contribution levels break down in early rounds (resulting in low payoﬀs).
Subsequently these individuals migrate to the sanctioning institution where a few partic-
ipants who are willing to sanction free-riders enforce high contribution levels (resulting
in high payoﬀs). Ultimately, no individuals interact in the sanction-free institution and
high contribution levels are sustained in the sanctioning institution until the end of the
experiment. As argued by Henrich (2006), G¨ urerk et al. (2006)’s experiment is a neat
example of competition between groups or institutions that is assumed to be at the heart
of social learning processes that can be made responsible for the establishment of social
norms in large scale societies (see e.g. Henrich and Boyd, 2001, Friedman and Singh, 2009,
or Herold, 2010). While some (e.g., negatively reciprocal) individuals have a propensity to
sanction low contributions to the public good, prefer the sanctioning institution already at
the beginning of the experiment, and establish high contribution levels therein, other (e.g.,
proﬁt maximizing) individuals seek to adopt the practices of the payoﬀ-superior institution
and therefore vacate the sanction-free institution over time.
In our experiment, self-selection yields a rather stable co-existence of institutions; unlike
in G¨ urerk et al. (2006) where individuals ﬁnally coordinate on one of the environments.
Our theoretical model allows for such a co-existence. Individuals with suﬃciently pro-
nounced costs of lying and being lied to have a propensity to sanction lies, prefer the
sanctioning institution, and establish higher levels of truth-telling therein, while payoﬀ
maximizers see no reason to migrate into the payoﬀ-inferior sanctioning institution. As
individuals are randomly assigned a role in each round and the game without sanctions
is constant-sum, establishing truth-telling does not generate higher payoﬀs in the sanc-
tioning institution in our experiment whereas establishing high contributions did so in the
sanctioning institution in G¨ urerk et al. (2006). As a consequence, sanctioners may stay
in the sanctioning institution but do not create an environment that eventually attracts
the others. This creates “sub-societies” with distinct economic performance (i.e., aggre-
gate payoﬀs) and communication modes (i.e., levels of truth-telling). While the (payoﬀ
29superior) sanction-free institution is fairly described by a population of proﬁt maximizing
individuals, the persistence of the (payoﬀ inferior) sanctioning institution requires a more
complex modeling of individual preferences (as suggested in our model with costs of lying
and being lied to).
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33A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Fix λ ∈ [0,∞). For the sender,
p =
eλE[u(truth)]
eλE[u(truth)] + eλE[u(lie)] =
1
1 + eλ(E[u(lie)]−E[u(truth)]),








eλE[v(trust)] + eλE[v(distrust)] =
1
1 + eλ(E[u(distrust)]−E[u(trust)]),





Hence, p and q and thereby equilibrium probabilities p∗ and q∗ are independent of d (Part
(i)).
If c = 0 or if λ = 0, then p∗ = q∗ = 1
2 (Part (ii)).
To show that λ > 0 implies that p∗ and q∗ are strictly increasing in c (Part (iii)), ﬁx















(1 + eλ(4−8p))2. (2)
Suppose ﬁrst, to the contrary, that
∂p
∂c = 0. Then,
∂q
∂c = 1
8 by equation (1) and
∂q
∂c = 0 by
equation (2). So, this cannot be. Suppose next, again to the contrary, that
∂p
∂c < 0. Then,
∂q




8 by equation (1). Since this is again a contradiction, we
can conclude that
∂p
∂c > 0. So, it follows from equation (2) that
∂q
∂c > 0. Finally, uniqueness
is obtained from
∂p
∂q < 0 and
∂q
∂p > 0.
34Proof of Proposition 2
Fix λ ∈ [0,∞). It is easy to see that r∗
truth,trust = 1/(1 + e5λ), r∗
truth,distrust = 1/(1 + eλ),
r∗
lie,trust = 1/(1 + eλ(1−d)), and r∗








only if λ > 0 and d > 0. Using the sanctioning probabilities, we get
p =
1























If λ = 0, then p∗ = q∗ = 0.5.
Next, suppose that λ > 0. If c = d = 0, then f = (1−2q)(1/(1+e−5λ)+(10q−5)/(1+
e−λ)) and g = (2p−1)(1/(1+e−λ)+(5−10p)/(1+e−5λ). One can then easily verify that


























































(1 + eλf)2 (4)
24This follows from 5/(1+e−λ) ≥ 5/2, 1/(1+e−5λ) ≤ 1, 5/(1+e−λ(1−d)) ≥ 0 and 1/(1+e−λ(5−d)) ≤ 1.








(1 + eλg)2. (5)
Suppose ﬁrst that
∂p
∂c = 0. Then,
∂q
∂c = 1/a > 0 by equation (4) and
∂q
∂c = 0 by equation (5).
So, this cannot be. Suppose next, again to the contrary, that
∂p
∂c < 0. Then,
∂q
∂c > 1/a > 0
by equation (4) and
∂q
∂c < 0 by equation (5) because b < 0. Consequently, it has to be that
∂p
∂c > 0. So, it follows from b < 0 that
∂q
∂c as well. Finally, uniqueness is obtained from
∂p




In this section, we show that our results are robust with respect to the type elicitation
procedure. 70 out of 160 subjects never sanction after history lie–trust, so these subjects
should always form part of the group of the others. Similarly, the 36 subjects who always
sanction after this history should likely be classiﬁed as sanctioners.26 Hence, the main task
of a robustness analysis is to vary the assignment of the remaining 54 subjects.
In the main part of the paper, a subject is classiﬁed as a sanctioner if the degree of
conﬁdence with which we reject the hypothesis that this subject punishes the sender after
the history lie–trust with a probability of at most one half during the random assignment
phase is less than 0.20. We now analyze how the results change if the threshold p-value of
this test is varied between 5% and 40% (in ﬁve-percent steps). Thereby, the condition is
relaxed as the p-value increases and more subjects are classiﬁed as sanctioners. Figure 7
shows that the percentage of sanctioners increases from about 25% for p = 0.05 to roughly
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Figure 7: Percentages of sanctioners (bullets) and others (circles) in the experimental population
for the eight diﬀerent classiﬁcation thresholds.
Results 1, 3, and 6 only contain observations on the entire population and are therefore
unaﬀected by the type elicitation procedure. Result 2 establishes that the punishment rate
of the sanctioners (others) is greater after history lie–trust than after history truth–distrust
in both phases (in the selection phase). The estimations of the logit-AQRE supported this
insight because the model parameter d turned out to be far bigger for the sanctioners.
Figure 8 analyzes how this ﬁnding changes with the employed p-value. The sanctioning
26It may happen that some of these subjects happen to play the history lie–trust only a few times, so
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Figure 8: Sanctioning rates after truth–distrust (circles) and lie–trust (bullets) for the sanctioners
( left column) and the others (right column) throughout the random assignment phase (top row)
and the selection phase (bottom row) for the eight diﬀerent classiﬁcation thresholds.
rate after truth–distrust during the random assignment phase is almost identical for both
subgroups independently of the assignment so that the size of the parameter d is entirely
determined by the sanctioning rate after history lie–trust. We see that the sanctioning
rate after lie–trust is slightly decreasing in the p-value for both subgroups, which is very
intuitive: the marginal subjects added to the group of sanctioners and taken from the group
of others when increasing the p-value punish less often than the subjects who already belong
to the group of sanctioners but more than those who form part of the group of the others.
The ﬁgure also shows the big persistent diﬀerence in behavior of the two subgroups. The
diﬀerence in the sanctioning rate between the two histories is about 75% for the sanctioners
in both phases, whereas for the others, there is no diﬀerence in the random assignment
phase and a small diﬀerence of about 10% – 20% (depending on the p-value) in the selection
phase. Consequently, Result 2 is very robust with respect to the assignment procedure.
Result 4 states that only the sanctioners tell the truth excessively and that they do so
in both phases. One main implication of this result in terms of the logit-AQRE is that
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Figure 9: Truth-telling rates for the sanctioners (bullets) and the others (circles) in the sanction-
free institution (left column) and the sanctioning institution (right column) during the random
assignment phase (top row) and the selection phase (bottom row) for the eight diﬀerent classiﬁ-
cation thresholds.
Figure 9 demonstrates the robustness of this ﬁnding. Independently of the assign-
ment procedure, only the sanctioners tell the truth excessively in both the sanction–free
and the sanctioning institution. The others even tend to lie excessively in the sanction-
ing institution for high p-values (that is, if many subjects are classiﬁed as sanctioners).
Consequently, one of our main ﬁndings – the group of sanctioners is responsible for the
over-communication phenomenon on the aggregate level – holds true for all eight assign-
ment procedures.
Since Result 2 and 4 establish together that the others should be modeled as pay-
oﬀ maximizers and that the sanctioners display non-standard preferences towards truth-
telling, the main question raised in this paper (and aﬃrmatively answered by Result 5) is
whether the subjects anticipate the diﬀerent performance of the two institutions in terms
of truth-telling and payoﬀ, and self-select accordingly. Figure 10 shows that this result is
robust as well. In fact, the sanctioners always select the sanctioning institution in more
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Figure 10: Institutional selection for the sanctioners (bullets) and the others (circles) for the eight
diﬀerent classiﬁcation thresholds.
Result 7 is the last result in the paper analyzing subgroup behavior. It states that
(a) in the sanction-free institution, only the others trust excessively and that they do
so only during the random assignment phase, (b) both subgroups trust excessively in
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Figure 11: Trust rates for the sanctioners (bullets) and the others (circles) in the sanction-free
institution (left column) and the sanctioning institution (right column) during the random assign-
ment phase (top row) and the selection phase (bottom row) for the eight diﬀerent classiﬁcation
thresholds.
40The upper left panel of Figure 11 reveals that we are actually not able to claim that only
the others trust excessively in the sanction–free institution during the random assignment
phase. It rather seems that both subgroups trust with a probability slightly above 50%,
but depending on the actual assignment one group or the other trusts more. However, the
two results mentioned in point (b) and (c) are very robust.
Our discussion has shown so far that the results presented in the paper hold true if the
p-value is varied between 0.05 and 0.40. But did we consider a suﬃcient number of diﬀerent
p-values? In the end, even at a p-value of 0.40 there are still some of the 54 doubtful subjects
who sanction sometimes but not always left in the group of the others. To be completely
sure that the results are robust, we present in Table 10 the choice probabilities of the most
extreme assignment procedure left; that is, the assignment procedure when the group of
sanctioners consists of all subjects who sanction at least once after history lie–trust and
the group of the others consists of all subjects who never sanction after this history.
Sanctioners Others
RAP SP RAP SP
Sanctioning
History lie–trust 93% 78% 0% 7%
History truth–distrust 27% 20% 17% 4%
Truth-telling
SFI 58% 59% 49% 52%
SI 67% 67% 48% 42%
Choice for SI 53% 20%
Trust
SFI 57% 50% 54% 51%
SI 79% 89% 65% 75%
Table 10: Choice probabilities when the group of sanctioners consists of all subjects who punish
at least once after history lie–trust.
Again, none of our main results change. In particular, (a) the diﬀerence in the punish-
ment rate after history lie–trust and truth–distrust is far greater for the sanctioners, (b)
the sanctioners are responsible for the excessive truth-telling in both institutions, and (c)
the sanctioners opt for the sanctioning institution far more often than the others. This
demonstrates an independence of our results on the details of the classiﬁcation procedure.27





thank you for taking part in this experiment! It will last about 2 hours. You will be
compensated according to your performance during the experiment. In order to ensure
that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we would like to ask you to follow
the general rules during the whole experiment:
• please do not communicate with your fellow students!
• please do not forget to switch oﬀ your mobile phone!
• read the instructions carefully. If something is not well explained or any question
turns up now or at any time later in the experiment, then ask one of the exper-
imenters. Do, however, not ask out loud, but raise your hand! We will clarify
questions privately.
• you may take notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• after the experiment, please remain seated till we paid you oﬀ.
• if you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have
to exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. None of your fellow students nor anybody else will ever
learn them from us.
Environment 1
The central situation of the experiment is the situation depicted in Figure 12 with the
following underlying story.
A B
1 ; 5 5 ; 1
Table A
A B
5 ; 1 1 ; 5
Table B
Figure 12: Central situation of the experiment
42There are two players, a sender and a receiver. In the beginning, the computer randomly
selects one of the payoﬀ tables A and B, each with equal probability. Only the sender will
be (correctly) informed which table has been selected. Next, the sender transmits either
the message “Table A has been selected” or the message “Table B has been selected” to the
receiver. Please, observe that the sender can transmit whatever message he prefers. After
observing the sender’s message, the receiver decides whether to take action A (that is to
select column A) or to take action B (that is to select column B). The interpretation of
the actions is that the receiver says either I believe the actual payoﬀ table is A or I believe
the actual payoﬀ table is B. The payoﬀs to the sender and the receiver, which are given
by the numbers in the corresponding cell, depend only on the table actually chosen by the
computer and the action selected by the receiver. The ﬁrst number in the cell corresponds
to the payoﬀ of the sender, the second number to the payoﬀ of the receiver. In short,
if the receiver’s action matches with the actual table she receives 5 ECU (Experimental
Currency Units) and the sender 1 ECU. Otherwise, payoﬀs are the opposite. For example,
if the computer chooses table A, the tells the receiver that table A has been selected, and
the receiver takes action A, then the sender gets 1 ECU and the receiver 5 ECU.
Environment 2
The second environment extends the ﬁrst environment. After receiving feedback on the
table chosen by the computer and the decisions of the sender and the receiver, the receiver
has to make a ﬁnal decision. She has to decide whether to accept the payoﬀs for both
participants or whether to reduce the payoﬀ of both participants to zero.
Matching
This experimental session consists of 100 rounds. In total, 20 subjects participate in this
experiment. In every of the ﬁrst 60 rounds, the computer assigns you randomly to one of the
two environments. With 70% probability you will be assigned to the second environment.
Next, you are randomly matched with another participant from the same environment to
form a pair. In each pair, one participant is randomly chosen to be the sender, and one to
be the receiver. This process is random. Your proﬁle may change every round with respect
to three variables: the environment you are assigned to (1 or 2), the participant you are
matched with (some subject from the same environment), and the role you have (sender
43or receiver). The matching is anonymous, so you will never learn with whom you formed
a pair. After every round you receive a complete feedback of the decisions of both players,
the payoﬀs from the round, and your accumulate payoﬀ.
In the second phase of the experiment, the last 40 rounds, you can decide whether you
want to be in environment 1 or in environment 2. This decision is taken every round anew.
Given your decision for the current round, you are again randomly matched with another
participant from the same environment to form a pair. In each pair, one participant is
randomly chosen to be the sender, and one to be the receiver. Observe that if an odd
number of participants choose an environment it becomes impossible to divide all players
into pairs. In this situation, the participant that stays single does not have to make
decisions and gets a ﬁxed payoﬀ of 3 ECU. The matching is anonymous, so you will never
learn with whom you formed a pair. After every round you receive a complete feedback of
the decisions of both players, the payoﬀs from the round, and your accumulate payoﬀ.
Payment
The points that you accumulate in course of the experiment will determine your payment.
The exchange rate ECU/Euros is such that every ECU in the experiments is equal to 5
Eurocents.
Closing
At the end of the experiment, we would like to ask you to complete a short on-screen ques-
tionnaire. But, before we start, we would like to ask you to answer the control questions on
the bottom of this page. Once ready, please raise your hand, and one of the experimenters
will check your answers. The software will be started as soon as all answers have been
checked. So, please, be patient.
Thank you again and good luck with the experiment! And, please, make your decisions
carefully—your reward depends on your performance during the experiment.
44Control questions
Please, answer the following questions! One of the experimenters will go round, check the
answers and discuss any problems.
Please ﬁll in your subject id:
Statement True False
In the 43th round of the experiment, I will be able to select my favorite
environment.
If I am playing the role of sender this round, I can be sure to be playing
the role as receiver next round.
I never know whom of the other participants I am matched with.
As a sender I can be sure that the receiver regards my message as
credible.
In the second environment, before making the decision of whether
or not to reduce the payoﬀs of both participants, I am informed about the
selected table and the payoﬀs resulting from my choice as a receiver.
My decisions in the ﬁrst phase do not inﬂuence my payoﬀs.
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Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and
institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We nd that
in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly
after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling
beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely to choose the sanctio-
ning institution. Sanctioning and non-sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice
is endogenous and the former shows a higher level of truth-telling but lower material
payos. It is shown that our experimental ndings are consistent with the equilibri-
um analysis of a logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups
of individuals: one consisting of subjects who perceive non-monetary lying costs as
senders and non-monetary costs when being lied to as receivers and one consisting
of payo maximizers.
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